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Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy
Bernard E. Harcourt

The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from
bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit or
implicit—in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a more
efficient method of allocating resources than forced exchange… When transaction costs
are low, the market is, virtually by definition, the most efficient method of allocating
resources. Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be discouraged by a legal
system bent on promoting efficiency.
Richard Posner (1985)

The market is the best mechanism ever invented for efficiently allocating resources to
maximize production… I also think that there is a connection between the freedom of the
marketplace and freedom more generally.

Barack O

The turn of the twenty‐first century witnessed important shifts in punishment in the United States and
other western industrialized nations. The most shocking and graphic trend, in the United States at least,
is mass incarceration—the exponential rise in the number and rate of prisoners in state and federal
penitentiaries and in county jails. After fifty years of relative stability, the rate of incarceration in the
United States began climbing exponentially in 1973 to the point where, today, one out of a hundred
adults is behind bars. Similar though more attenuated trends were observed in Italy, France, the United
Kingdom, and other European countries during the late twentieth and early twenty‐first centuries.
Another stunning shift in the United States is the turn to actuarial methods and instruments—to
risk assessment tools to predict the success or failure of inmates on parole, to assess the potential for
future dangerousness, and to identify violent sexual offenders. Canada too began experimenting with
actuarial instruments and the logic of actuarial prediction—though not necessarily the instruments
themselves—penetrated a number of European countries, such as France, which warmly embraced
preventative detention (rétention de sûreté) in 2007.
The United States, Canada, and European countries also experienced—at different times and to
different extents—the increased use of order‐maintenance policing strategies, such as zero tolerance
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and broken windows policing; harsher treatment of juvenile offenders; increased use of video
surveillance, biometric data collection, data mining, and information gathering through initiatives such
as the “total awareness program” in the United States, CCTV video surveillance in the United Kingdom,
and DNA database collection in England and in France; and harsher sentencing practices, including the
adoption of mandatory minimum sentences, “three‐strikes laws,” drug and gun enhancements, and
lengthier fixed sentencing guidelines.
In many of these developments, the United States has been a net exporter of ideas and
technologies, such as broken windows policing and mandatory minimum sentencing. But not in all. The
United Kingdom has been a leader in the use of CCTV video surveillance and the collection of DNA;
France was an early innovator in the field of paramilitary anti‐riot security forces; and Italy has been at
the forefront of bunker‐style judicial proceedings. The leading actuarial instrument used in the United
States—the “Level of Services Inventory‐Revised” (LSI‐R)—was actually invented and developed by
Canadian researchers, and the same is true of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist‐Revised (PCL‐R).

I.

It is tempting to view these developments as evidence of something new that emerged in the mid‐
1970s—of a new culture of control, a new penology, or a new turn to biopower. The shocking graph of
American incarceration rates—with its exponential curve beginning in 1973—is seared in our collective
imagination, and, along with the simultaneous collapse of the rehabilitative model and the enactment of
law‐and‐order measures around that time, it militates in favor of an explanation that would coincide,
temporally, with the early to mid 1970s.
But it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on that pivotal moment. Order‐
maintenance, after all, is a disciplinary practice that traces back at least to the nineteenth century
(Foucault 2004a:47; Harcourt 2001:160). Actuarial tools were used to predict deviance in the early
1930s in the United States (Harcourt 2007a:59) and they too trace back to positivist criminology and the
défense sociale movement of late nineteenth century Europe (Tulkens 1986). Biometric‐data collection
and its use have tragic antecedents in the early twentieth century in Europe and North America—with
forced sterilization, eugenics, and phrenology (King 1999). And even mass incarceration is by no means
unprecedented. The fact is, the United States institutionalized mental health patients in all sorts of
closed facilities in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, at similar rates to imprisonment today (Harcourt 2006;
2007b). Those trends are equally shocking:
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Figure: Rates of Institutionalization for Residents in All Mental Institutions and State
and Federal Prisons in the United States (per 100,000 adults)
In the period 1935 to 1963, the United States consistently institutionalized in mental institutions
and prisons at rates above 700 per 100,000 adults—with highs of 778 in 1939 and 786 in 1955. And
there were a panoply of mental institutions at mid‐century, including not only state and county public
mental hospitals, but public and private institutions for “mental defectives and epileptics,” public and
private institutions for “the mentally retarded,” psychiatric wards in veterans’ hospitals, “psychopathic”
hospitals, as well as private mental hospitals. The cumulative rate of detention was at least as high as it
is today.1
It is important, then, to step back and explore the arc of penality over a longer course. To relate
mass incarceration and these recent developments to their earlier kin at the turn of the twentieth
century and to place them within a larger historical framework spanning several centuries—not just
decades. What that larger perspective reveals is that the pattern of confinement and control in the past
century has been facilitated by the emergence and gradual dominance of “neoliberal penality.” By
neoliberal penality, I have in mind a form of rationality in which the penal sphere is pushed outside
political economy and serves the function of a boundary: the penal sanction is marked off from the
dominant logic of classical economics as the only space where order is legitimately enforced by the
state. On this view, the bulk of human interaction—which consists of economic exchange—is viewed as
voluntary, compensated, orderly, and tending toward the common good; the penal sphere is the outer
bound, where the government can legitimately interfere, there and there alone.

1

The rates in the figure above do not include jail populations because data on jail populations are extremely sparse
and not reliably measured until 1970; but nevertheless, when they are included in the overall national numbers, the
trend remains the same: only recently does the prison revolution of the 1980s and 1990s approach the earlier levels
of aggregated institutionalization from the 1940s and 50s (Harcourt 2007b).
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This discourse of neoliberal penality—born in the eighteenth century, nurtured in the
nineteenth century, and today in full fruition—facilitates the growth of the carceral sphere. Neoliberal
penality makes it easier to resist government intervention in the marketplace and to embrace
criminalizing any and all deviations from the market. It facilitates passing new criminal statutes and
wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that is where administration is necessary, that is
where the state can legitimately act, that is the proper sphere of governing. By marginalizing and
pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, neoliberal penality unleashes the state on the
carceral sphere.
This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction dominates the public
imagination today and has led to a fundamental separation between the natural order and efficiency of
market exchange and the need for decisive governmental intervention in the penal domain. The criminal
sanction tends to be viewed today as the exceptional extremity to an otherwise unregulated orderly
market, where there—and there alone—the state must intervene to calibrate the calculations of rational
actors. It is this precise combination—order in the market and government at the border—that helps
shape the modern neoliberal vision of penality. It is precisely this view that is reflected in the writings of
Richard Posner, eloquently formulated in the simple but blunt epigraph quoted above—in his idea that
the major function of the criminal sanction in a capitalist society is to prevent market bypassing (Posner
1985:1195). In this passage, the idea of market efficiency leads to a penal theory where the only
legitimate space for the government to intervene is in punishment. Elsewhere, it must leave alone
voluntary, compensated exchanges—as if the space of the market existed somehow independently of
the policing, as if the two domains were distinct.
These ideas of market efficiency and of the penal exception trace back, remarkably, to earlier
liberal thought. The first—the idea of naturally efficient markets—traces directly to the birth,
emergence, and triumph of the idea of natural order in economics. It traces to the Physiocratic thought
of François Quesnay, the Marquis de Mirabeau, Dupont de Nemours, Le Mercier de la Rivière, and other
early French economists during the period 1756 to 1767. Their writings were highly influential in France
and abroad, and it is precisely their notion of natural order that metamorphosed, over time, into the
modern economic notion of market efficiency that is at the heart of neoliberal thought.
The birth of natural order in the writings of the Physiocrats also led seamlessly to the expansion
of the penal sphere as the only legitimate space for governmental administration and intervention. The
idea of orderliness matured into a political theory that combined inactivity in commercial matters with
centralized, authoritarian policing elsewhere—what the Physiocrats referred to as the doctrine of “legal
despotism.” Under the rubric of legal despotism, François Quesnay and Mercier de la Rivière formulated
a political ideal of complete governmental inactivity in all but the penal sphere. Given the existence of
natural laws governing commerce, the économistes envisaged no role for the legislature except to
criminalize and punish severely those who deviate from the natural order.
Natural order in the universe implied legal despotism in human affairs. The Physiocrats
embraced this doctrine in 1767 with the publication that same year of both Quesnay’s essay,
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Despotisme de la Chine, and Le Mercier’s book, L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques. Their
economic writings led them, in a syllogistic manner, to the conclusion that natural order in the
autonomous economic sphere demands both that there be no human intervention (in terms of positive
law) in the economic realm and that positive law limit itself to punishing deviance from the natural law,
in other words that it limit itself to punishing theft and violence. The logic proceeded as follows:
1. The economic realm—agricultural and commercial—is governed by fundamental natural
laws that inherently promote the best interests of mankind.
2. Positive, man‐made laws can at best simply mirror the natural order and instantiate natural
law. In the economic domain, positive law usually deviates from natural law, producing
disorder rather than order.
3. Therefore, positive law should not extend to the domain of natural laws, or, as Quesnay
stated, “Positive legislation should therefore not reach the domain of physical laws”
(Quesnay 2005:1017). Precisely for this reason, there is no need for a separate legislature.
All law‐making power should be centralized in a unified executive—a legal despot—who
learns and directly implements the laws of nature.
4. There are, however, some men whose passions are out of order—whose passions, Quesnay
wrote, are “déréglées” (Quesnay 2005:1017)—and who fail to appreciate and follow the
fundamental laws of nature.
5. The only legitimate object of positive man‐made laws, then, is to punish severely those men
whose passions are out of order in order to protect society from these thieves and
derelicts—“des voleurs et des méchans,” as Quesnay would write (Quesnay 2005:1017).

The notion of natural order does all the work in this logical argument, and it leads inexorably to
a penal sphere that is, on the one hand, marginalized but, on the other hand, unleashed and allowed to
expand without any limitation. Since some men’s passions are out of order and these men cannot
appreciate the natural order, the legal despot has full and unlimited discretion to repress and punish.
Man‐made positive law serves only one legitimate function: to punish those who violate the natural
order, who are disordered, who do not respect the laws of nature. Natural order went hand‐in‐hand
with “legal despotism” in eighteenth century Physiocratic thought—in the very same way that market
efficiency today goes hand‐in‐hand with neoliberal penality.

II.

Loïc Wacquant has made a significant contribution by tying our recent developments in penality to the
larger issues of neoliberalism and to the regulation of the poor in his important essay in this issue,
Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare and Social Insecurity. Wacquant frames his
intervention in relation to the insightful writings of Frances Fox Piven and David Harvey, and, at least in
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part, in opposition to Michel Foucault’s notion of discipline. I would not be so quick, however, to dismiss
Foucault. The place to look for guidance in Foucault’s work is not in his magisterial Discipline and Punish
and the notion of discipline that he developed there, but instead in Foucault’s 1978 and 1979 lectures at
the Collège de France—in Sécurité, Population, Territoire (2004a) and Naissance de la biopolitique
(2004b). In those lectures, Foucault explored the more recent penal manifestations of the late 1970s—
the management of large carceral populations—through a different paradigm than discipline, one that
he called sécurité and later renamed gouvernementalité (Foucault 2004a:111). Foucault began to
explore the concept of sécurité as a way to understand the shift in our penal practices away from the
treatment and reform of the individual and toward the management of large prison populations. Not
entirely surprisingly, those lectures on sécurité and biopolitics would become, in truth, lectures on
neoliberalism (2004b:23, 25).
In this essay, I would like to use the term “neoliberalism” to get at a larger arc of political and
social theory that spans several centuries. The term itself—like most terms—is deeply contested, even
among those who carefully study the concept (Campbell and Pedersen 2001:270). I will use the term
here to capture at least three specific dimensions. The first represents a chronological dimension. It
distinguishes twentieth century thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler
from early liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith and François Quesnay. The second dimension is more
“ideological.” Early liberal thinkers had a set of ideas that had not been put to the test; they were, in a
sense, more utopian or idealist. Contemporary neoliberals come after a lot of experimentation and
some history, including the Great Depression, the New Deal, and the 2008 financial collapse. In this
sense, contemporary neoliberalism has a more pronounced ideological element because it often
minimizes historical market failure. The third dimension has to do with conviction or faith: neoliberalism
here is understood as the belief that we actually live in a free market system in the United States today
and that this system has triumphed. It is the belief that the early European markets of the eighteenth
century were completely and excessively regulated and that those of the United States today are free.
Overall, then, I am employing the term neoliberal in a slightly larger sense than some of the
more critical writings on neoliberalism which tend to focus more heavily on the period following 1970—
referring to the period before that as “embedded liberalism”—and especially on the rise of Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, on the wave of privatization that ensued, and on the “Washington
Consensus” that followed in the 1990s (Harvey 2005:13, 11; Duménil and Lévy 2004:1, 205‐6, 211; Peck
and Tickell 2002:33, 37). I am also trying to distinguish neoliberalism from globalization—with which it is
too often confounded (Peck and Tickell 2002:35)—as well as “transnational neoliberalisms” (Peck
2004:394).
From this larger historical perspective, neoliberalism today represents a set of default
assumptions in favor of unregulated markets. It does not map on perfectly to the more extreme market
libertarian position associated with the early Chicago School. It is instead a more moderate view: the
view that government intervention in the economic domain tends to be inefficient and should therefore
be avoided. What characterizes this more moderate view is a set of softer a priori assumptions that are
reflected, especially, in the rhetoric of economic debate. In contrast to the more extreme rhetoric of the
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early Chicago School—for instance, the argument that the free market is practically always more
efficient—market neoliberals suggest that government intervention tends to be less efficient; that it is
generally the case that market mechanisms work better, in part because of lower transaction costs, but
also because market participants are better information gatherers and tend to be more invested in the
ultimate outcome; and that government agencies suffer from greater principal‐agent problems, are less
nimble at adjusting to changing market conditions, and become more entrenched and subject to
interest group capture. These are familiar arguments and, together, they tend to promote a loose
default position that favors market mechanisms over “regulation”—a tilt in favor of “free markets.” It is,
in many ways, what Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff identify as that “impulse to displace political
sovereignty with the sovereignty of ‘the market,’ as if the latter had a mind and a morality of its own”
(2001:43).
The logic of neoliberal penality facilitates contemporary punishment practices by encouraging
the belief that the legitimate space for government intervention is in the penal sphere—there and there
alone. The key to understanding our contemporary punishment practices, then, turns on the emergence
in the eighteenth century of the idea of natural order and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, over
the course of the twentieth century, into the concept of market efficiency. It is the idea of natural order
that renders coherent and makes possible the belief in self‐adjusting and self‐sustaining markets. The
idea of self‐stabilizing internal flows that function best when left alone—this conceptualization of
natural orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of natural harmony in the economic realm, is what
allowed eighteenth century thinkers to reimagine social reality, to separate economy and society, and to
relocate and expand the penal sphere.

III.

But it was not always so. There was an earlier time when the organization, administration, and policing
of markets formed an integral part of the field of public economy. The young Adam Smith understood
this well and in fact used the discourse of police to lecture on public economy, on the regulation of
markets, and on monopolies, money, and trade—on how, in sum, to increase the wealth of a nation. In
his Lectures on Jurisprudence, which he delivered at Glasgow University during the period 1762 to
1764—after the publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 but before the Wealth of Nations
in 1776—Smith used, and used exclusively, the rubric of “police” to discuss public economy. He
identified the principal task of “police” as facilitating bon marché. Once the internal security of a nation
was ensured and subjects could benefit from their private property, Smith reportedly lectured in 1762‐
63, the state’s attention should turn to the task of promoting the state’s wealth. “This produces what we
call police,” Smith said. “Whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce,
agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the police” (Smith 1978:5 [i.1‐
2]).
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Smith traced the notion of police to French administration, citing the folklore that the king of
France demanded three services from his lieutenant général de police—namely, that he assure the
cleanliness and security of the nation and the abundance and cheapness of goods at market. Smith
referred specifically to the marquis d’Argenson, chief of police in Paris from 1697 to 1718, and to the
legend that, upon acceding to the post, d’Argenson was told that the king of France expected him to
take care of three things: “1st, the clean[n]ess or neteté; 2nd, the aisance, ease or security; and 3rd, bon
marché or cheapness of provisions” (Smith 1978:5 [i.2]). Thus, under the heading of police, Smith stated
in his 1763‐64 lectures, “we will consider the opulence of a state,” or, more specifically, “the
consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the most proper way of procuring
wealth and abundance” (Smith 1978:398 [5]; 487 [205]).
To the early public economists, “police” was what ensured the abundant provision of necessary
foods and commodities. As Michel Foucault, Pasquale Pasquino, Mariana Valverde, and others have
shown, this early notion of “police” conveyed a number of meanings—not just the enforcement function
associated with the lieutenant général de la police that, at least in some respects, resembles more
closely our contemporary understanding of law enforcement and blue uniforms (Olivier‐Martin 1988
[1945]:13‐22, Kaplan 1976:Vol.I:11‐14; Foucault STP 2004:320‐322; Pasquino 1991:109‐116; Napoli
2003:8; Dubber and Valverde 2006:1‐2). The expression “police” also captured, in broader terms, what
we could call today “administration,” but administration limited to the subdivisions of the state; the
term gouvernement or governing, in contrast, covered the administration of l’État or the state (Olivier‐
Martin 1988 [1945]:13). But the different meanings were imbricated: the administration of subsistence
and markets fell under the jurisdiction of policing functions and were perceived as calling for
surveillance. As the early Smith lectures demonstrate, public economy and “police” were continuous.
It would take but a small step to extend this logic directly to the field of punishment. The young
Milanese aristocrat, Cesare Beccaria, would do just that in his short but seminal tract, Dei delitti e delle
pene (On Crimes and Punishments)—published in 1764. The new field of public economy, Beccaria
boasted, had tamed and civilized nations through commerce. “We have discovered the true relations
between sovereign and subjects,” Beccaria declared, “and there is waged among nations a silent war by
trade, which is the most humane sort of war and more worthy of reasonable men” (1995:8). The same
lessons, Beccaria believed, could tame and civilize our punishment practices, and, in the process,
eliminate the brutal excesses of seventeenth century penality.
Under Beccaria’s influence, the field of public economy would colonize the penal domain and
impose the same logic of measured and proportional responses to the same problem of man’s natural
tendency to deviance. In the penal sphere—just as in the economic domain—the solution Beccaria
proposed was to properly administer a rational framework of tariffs and prices. For Beccaria, “police”
was an integral part of public economy. Beccaria’s lectures in public economy delivered in Milan in
1769—the notes of which were published posthumously—covered five areas: agriculture, arts and
manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police. “Of Police” constituted an integral part of the study of
public economy—an entire section alongside commerce and finance—because it shared the same
rationality, namely that of public administration (Beccaria 1984‐90; Pasquino 1991).
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The common thread in the young Adam Smith and Beccaria is the continuity between “police”
administration and economics. For both, the two spheres were completely overlapping. To Smith, the
umbrella category is “police,” and that category subsumes the discussion of public economy and the
wealth of a nation. To Beccaria—and other cameralists of his time—the overarching category is public
economy, within which “police” forms one important sector alongside commerce and finance. In both,
though, the two domains are seamless and continuous. The two fields overlay.

IV.

It is precisely this vision of a seamless relation between public economy and “police” that gives way in
the second half of the eighteenth century to a far different ideal. If cheapness and plenty, if bon marché
was the goal of public economy and of the police des grains at mid‐century, things could hardly have
been more different only a decade later. The contrast is striking and captured by the new dogma of
François Quesnay:
Abondance et non‐valeur n’est pas richesse.
Disette et cherté est misère.
Abondance et cherté est opulence (Quesnay 2005:570).
In other words, abundance and plenty do not translate into the wealth of a nation. Scarcity and high
prices, of course, are misery. It is abundance and high prices that produces opulence.
This shift would radically transform the meaning, the connotation, and the role of policing—as it
did first in the writings of the earliest économistes. From François Quesnay’s first published contribution
in the field of political economy—his entry on Fermiers (Farmers) in Tome VI of the Encyclopédie in
1756—to his final contributions to economics collected and published in Dupont de Nemours’
Physiocratie in 1768, Quesnay would fundamentally reorient the relationship between public economy
and “police”: governmental intervention in the markets would become oppressive and interfere with
the autonomous functioning of an economic system governed by natural laws and natural order. By
1776, the year The Wealth of Nations was published, Adam Smith would no longer use the rubric
“police” to discuss public economy. In fact, the word “police” would appear rarely in the text of The
Wealth of Nations.
François Quesnay presented his idea of an autonomous economic system governed by natural
order in his Tableau économique, first published in an augmented volume of the Marquis de Mirabeau’s
L’Ami des hommes in 1760. The Tableau was a graphic depiction of cash and commodity flows between
the three principle classes of society—the cultivators, the property‐owners, and the manufacturers. By
means of a simple graph and its zig‐zag lines, Quesnay sought to visualize his main theses, namely that
agricultural production is the sole source of all societal wealth, that wealth can only be produced by
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means of an autonomous system of exchange, and therefore that the state must cease intervening with
tariffs, restricting the flow of trade, and interfering with other regulations.
Quesnay’s Tableau économique received a lot of attention because it attempted to graphically
and systematically represent an economic system—what Louis Dumont refers to as “an ordered whole”
(Dumont 1977:41).2 But what was even more important and influential on future liberal thought was not
simply the notion of an economic system, it was the underlying idea of natural order. Systems can
function well with external calibration and intervention: an engine may function as a perfect whole so
long as one adds fuel. What was remarkable about Quesnay’s Tableau is that his system was governed
by natural order and was entirely autonomous of external inputs. What Quesnay really contributed was
not just the idea of a system, but that of natural orderliness—an idea that would eventually receive its
most elaborate articulation in Le Mercier de la Rivière’s 1767 book, L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des
sociétés politiques.
The birth or, perhaps to be fair,3 the emergence and maturation of the idea of natural order
helped shape a vision of the economic sphere as an autonomous, self‐adjusting, and self‐regulated
system that could achieve a natural equilibrium spontaneously and produce increased wealth. This same
notion resurfaces in the later work of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, and, today, in the work of
contemporary neoliberal thinkers, such as Richard Posner and Richard Epstein. The idea of natural order
has metamorphosed today into the belief in the efficiency of the market.
It is precisely natural order that makes possible Richard Posner’s belief that “[w]hen transaction
costs are low, the market is, virtually by definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources”
(Posner 1985:1195‐96). In fact, natural efficiency is so central to Posner’s thought that he defines
criminal behavior in terms of efficiency: criminal behavior is human behavior that is inefficient. As
Posner explains, “I argue that what is forbidden is a class of inefficient acts” (1985:1195). The very
definition of crime turns on the notion of natural efficiency. In the very same way, the Physiocrats would
define criminality as disorder and deviance from natural laws. Today’s neoliberal thought traces back to
this severing of “police” and public economy.

2

This is precisely what Marx found so brilliant. Marx wrote of Quesnay’s Tableau, in his Theories of Surplus Value,
that “this attempt to represent the whole in one table that is composed in fact of only five lines, connecting six points
of departure to their endpoints, in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the infancy of public economy, was a
stroke of genius, without a doubt the most brilliant in the history of public economy” (Marx 1974:399).
3
Of course, the idea of natural order was not entirely new. Simone Meyssonnier, in her history of the origins of
French liberal thought in the eighteenth century, La Balance et l’Horloge (1989), traces the idea back to Pierre Le
Pesant de Boisguilbert who wrote almost one hundred years earlier in the period 1695 to 1707. Joseph Schumpeter
famously traced the notion back to the Scholastics—the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
(Schumpeter 1968:97). And Dupont de Nemours himself—the chief publicist and greatest admirer and disciple of
Quesnay—traced the Physiocratic doctrine to, among others, the Marquis d’Argenson, who is credited with the
maxim “Pas trop gouverner” (Dupont 1808:309). But true originality is not the sole source of influence. Quesnay’s
obsession with natural order was perceived as new—which is often what matters more. As new and radical. Many
believed that it inaugurated, in the words of Dupont de Nemours, “a new science in Europe” (Rothschild 2004:4)
and many championed Quesnay as the founding father of that new science.
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V.

The next question is: At what price have we come to believe that the economy is the realm of natural
order and that the legitimate sphere of policing—of administration and government—lies elsewhere? At
the price, first, of significantly distorting and expanding without limit the penal sphere, and, second, of
naturalizing and hiding the regulatory mechanisms in our contemporary markets and thereby masking
the enormous wealth distributions that occur daily.
First, the distortion of the penal sphere. The new penal paradigm significantly influenced
nineteenth century liberal and modern neoliberal thought. This is most evident in Jeremy Bentham’s
work. Though he, like Adam Smith, would reject Physiocratic thought—primarily because of Quesnay’s
devotion to agriculture as the sole means of creating national wealth—he embraced and developed a
notion of natural order in his economic writings and reproduced—by an odd conjunction of liberal
economic theory and Beccarian punishment theory—the same relationship between markets and
punishment: natural order in the economic sphere but government intervention in the penal sphere. On
the public economy side, as evidenced in his Manual of Political Economy written in 1794, Bentham
embraced Adam Smith’s liberalism (Bentham 1952 Vol. 3:233‐235). On the punishment side, however,
Bentham embraced Beccaria whole cloth. In all matters penal, Bentham aligned himself with Beccaria’s
notion of policing and administration—of a sphere of human activity that must be shot through with
government intervention. In fact, the criminal code, for Bentham, was precisely a “grand catalogue of
prices” by means of which the government set the price of deviance. The penal code was a menu of
fixed pricing—the exact opposite of laissez faire. Beccaria’s influence on Bentham’s writings on
punishment was formative (Hart 1982:45).
This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction dominates the public
imagination today. Modern penal practices in the United States are consistent with this. The size and the
cost of our neoliberal penal sphere in the United States far exceeds those of earlier periods.4 A study by
the PEW Center on States published in March 2008 reports that prison spending in the United States has
outpaced all other comparable spending budgets except Medicaid. “Criminal correction spending is
outpacing budget growth in education, transportation, and public assistance, based on state and federal
4

My argument focuses on a shift over time from an earlier penal rationality to neoliberal penality. As a result, it is
important to compare modern neoliberal penal practices to earlier periods in the same neoliberal countries, whether
it is the United States, Britain, or France. It is often tempting to compare modern neoliberalism to other
contemporary discourses—such as socialist, or communist, or fundamentalist, or authoritarian forms of rationality—
and to suggest that neoliberalism may or may not be worse. That it produces a larger penal sphere, more
punishment, more incarceration—or not. For these comparisons, many rely on the fact that the United States leads
the world in its rate of persons behind bars, and even in the raw number of persons in prison—taking the gold medal
even in competition with a country like China that has a population about three-and-a-half times larger than the
United States. Those comparisons between neoliberalism and other existing discourses, though, are not what
motivate my project. My argument is, in this loose sense, an internal critique of the direction that our discourse has
taken, suggesting that it has gone in a direction that facilitates the growth of the penal sphere and that it could have
gone in a very different direction. It is not, again, in a loose sense, an external critique in that it does not compare
neoliberalism with other contemporary discourses and does not evaluate whether the former is “better” or “worse”
in terms of its effects on the penal sphere.
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data. Only Medicaid spending grew faster than state corrections spending, which quadrupled in the past
two decades” (Moore 2009). According to the PEW report, corrections spending cost the states a
staggering $47 billion in 2008, in large part because of the extraordinarily high rates of incarceration—
“One in every 31 adults, or 7.3 million Americans, is in prison, on parole or probation, at a cost to the
states of $47 billion in 2008” (Moore 2009). The last time these costs were studied, in 2001, the fifty
states spent a combined $38 billion on corrections budgets alone (all of this excludes prison building)
(BJS 2004). California's annual corrections budget for 2007‐08 was almost $10 billion dollars in 2007,
nearly twice as large as it was in 2001 (CDCR 2007). For many states, the annual budget allocates more
funding for prisons than for four‐year colleges (MTF 2003). The numbers are staggering. With about one
percent of the adult population in the United States behind bars, the size and cost of our penal sphere is
undoubtedly greater than it was in pre‐liberal periods.
Second, the rhetoric of neoliberalism naturalizes the market and thereby hides the massive
distributions that takes place there. It masks the state’s role, the state’s ties to non‐state actors and
associations, and the extensive legal and regulatory framework that encases those entities. It also hides
the freedom that existed before. In other words, it masks both the amount of liberty in the earlier
eighteenth century and the amount of regulation today. There is, and has always been far more
“constraint” in our contemporary markets than we typically acknowledge today. The truth is, every
action of the broker, buyer, seller, investment bank, brokerage firm, exchange member—even non‐
member—is scrutinized and regulated. The rules, oversight committees, advisory letters, investigations,
as well as legal actions, abound. The list of dos and don’ts is extensive. For instance, exchange members
on the New York Stock Exchange may get together and fix the commission rate on stock transactions of
less than $500,000—that it, they may set the price of buying and selling stock—but freely negotiate
commissions in larger stock transactions (Gordon 1975). Brokerage firms may combine and use blacklists
to restrict retail buyers from reselling their public offering stock during a “retail restricted period” of
between thirty and ninety days following their purchase of newly offered stock, but the same brokerage
firms may allow large institutions to dump their stock in the aftermarket at any time (Friedman 2002).
The rules and regulations surrounding our modern markets are intricate and often arcane, and they
belie the simplistic idea that our markets are “free.” The reality is far more complex.

VI.

A genealogy of neoliberal penality—of which this essay is just a sketch—would seek to explore how this
mode of rationality became naturalized. How this dominant form of reasoning became believable. How
it became so obvious, and at what price. In this sense, this project continues in the furrow of a lengthy
nominalist tradition—a strain of thought that runs through the work of thinkers as far back as the
Medieval Franciscan friar William of Occam, to the sixteenth century Renaissance essays of Michel de
Montaigne, to the nineteenth century polemics of Friedrich Nietzsche. It starts by conceptualizing
“natural order” and “market efficiency” as what William of Occam would have called “universals” and
then explores what work those universals are accomplishing. It challenges the very existence of those
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universal categories in order to discover, first, what the designation serves, but second, what it hides
regarding the unique aspects of individual entities—in this case, individual forms of social and economic
organization.
The answer that I develop in these pages reflects this nominalist influence: we have developed
and deployed these categories or universals to make sense of what are in fact irreducibly individual
phenomena, to place discrete and divergent practices into a coherent framework, to deploy simple
heuristic devices or stereotypes to expedite our evaluation and judgment. In so doing so, we have
created structures of meaning that do work for us—at a steep price.
The historian, Paul Veyne, in his recent book Foucault: Sa pensée, sa personne (2008), excavates
a similar nominalist influence in the work of Foucault, drawing particular attention to the opening
passage of Foucault’s 1979 lectures, Naissance de la biopolitique (Harcourt 2008b; Veyne 2008:19).
Foucault’s method was to critically examine the very conceptions that we construct in order to learn
something about ourselves (Foucault 1994:726). In a similar vein, this brief genealogy asks in essence:
suppose that “natural order” or “market efficiency” does not exist. What does that tell us about the
work that those concepts perform?
My argument, ultimately, is premised on the belief that we have no way of knowing whether
our contemporary practices are more or less regulated, more or less freedom enhancing, more or less
coercive. We have far more administration today than meets the eye or that we tend to recognize.
Whether it amounts to more or less regulation than there was in the eighteenth century, that is
impossible to quantify. But, the fact is, we characterize our contemporary practices as more liberty
enhancing5—which is precisely the problem. We draw on the categories of liberty and constraint to
praise our modern practices. And in the process, we mask the distributions that these modern
practices—the free market regulations—operate. As John Campbell and Ode Pederson suggest,
correctly I believe, “neoliberalism does not so much involve deregulation as re‐regulation of economic
activity” (2001:3). The trouble is, it masks all that re‐regulation under the façade of deregulation.

Conclusion

It is surprising that the second epigraph was not penned by Friedrich Hayek, nor by Milton Friedman—
though it does echo Friedman’s statement that “economic freedom is also an indispensable means
toward the achievement of political freedom” (1962:8). No, those words belong instead to Barack
Obama, uttered at a time when, in the summer of 2008, the financial debacle was upon us—after the
collapse of Bear Stearns and of the securitized‐mortgage market. And even after the bottom would fall
out of the American banking system—after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the bailouts of Fannie Mae,
5

The work I am doing here bears a family resemblance to the research of Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy,
especially in their article “Moral Views of Market Society” where, expanding on Albert Hirschman’s analysis, they
depict the numerous representations of the market as civilizing, destructive, or feeble, and increasingly today as
intensely moralized and moralizing (Fourcade and Healy 2007:286).
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Freddie Mac, and A.I.G., and the passage of a $700 billion TARP rescue package for the financial
industry—President Obama’s Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, would nevertheless declare that:
“We have a financial system that is run by private shareholders, managed by private institutions, and
we’d like to do our best to preserve that system” (Krugman 2009). Never mind that the American
people, as a result of the first $350 billion partial nationalization of the biggest banks, were at that point
the largest shareholders of Citibank, with 7.8 percent of its equity, and the largest holders of Bank of
America stock, with 6 percent of its shares.
The persistence of this rhetoric of market efficiency is indeed remarkable. The perseverance of
both the faith in free markets and the use of that key dichotomy—free versus constrained, private
versus government controlled—is simply astonishing. And it has had a significant toll in the penal
sphere. By marginalizing and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, neoliberal rationality
effectively reinforces the carceral domain.
The hitch is that the foundational categories on the one hand of “natural order,” “market
efficiency,” or “the free market,” and on the other hand of “excessive regulation,” “governmental
inefficiency,” or “discipline,” are illusory and misleading categories that fail to capture the irreducibly
individual phenomena of different forms of market organization. In all markets, the state is present.
Naturally, it is present when it fixes the price of a commodity, such as wheat or bread. But it is also
present when it subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, when it grants a charter to the
Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits trading of an instrument like a futures contract, when it
protects the property interests of wheat wholesalers, when it criminalizes the coordination of prices,
when it allows the merger of grain companies, when it polices the timing of trades, etc. All markets are
highly regulated. At the same time, in all markets, there is freedom. Even in a controlled economy where
the price is fixed, there are variations in the quality of the goods sold and along other dimensions that
create product differentiation. These produce queues at certain stores and not at others.
In the economic sphere, there is liberty and there is constraint. What we see is a reflection on
us, not on the market. What is most important is to remember that the categories we use to organize,
understand, discuss, categorize, and compare the different organizing principles are just that—labels.
They do not capture the true individuality of the objects described. And they have the unfortunate
effect of obscuring rather than enlightening. They obscure by making one set of objects seem natural
and necessary, and the other naturally unnecessary.
This essay is just a prolegomenon, a necessary first step in the direction of properly assessing
modern forms of social and economic organization. Necessary, because of the deafening and dominant
discourse of natural order and market efficiency. The very idea that we would use the term “free” to
describe our current market system—a system which is regulated through and through—is a testament
to the work that needs to be done. It may be fair to say that neoliberalism has so deeply and
fundamentally distorted our understanding of economic systems that it will take a lot of work to reach
the point where we can properly assess different alternatives for the administration of markets and
punishment, and in the process dismantle our neoliberal penality.
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